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Abstract 
Public opinion in favor of regional unification is usually seen as key for successfully 
implementing such integration projects. We argue that, as a positive externality, it can also 
foster support for migration. Focusing on the case of Europe, we use in-group and out-group 
dynamics as a starting point and claim that citizens who are more supportive of EU 
unification tend to have dual-identity and more cosmopolitan attitudes, which is linked to 
more support for migration from outside the region. We employ hierarchical models using all 
existing rounds of the European Social Survey and complement this with a panel-data 
analysis based on the German Longitudinal Election Data to exploit the individual-level 
evolution of attitudes over time. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical 
expectations, and they shed new light on our understanding of how public attitudes toward 
migration are formed. 
 




























A large literature documents that public opinion is a key factor in the study of regional 
integration, affecting policymakers’ decision-making at times significantly. In the European 
context, which is also the focus of this research, public attitudes influence European Union 
(EU) politics through a variety of channels such as demonstrations and elections, and public 
support is key for the acceptance of EU law at the domestic level and the success of the 
integration project as a whole (Gabel, 1998). Accordingly, scholars have explored the extent 
to which public opinion is an important component of European integration and why citizens 
vary in their views toward this (McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005; De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden, 2006; Dinas and Pardos-Prado, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2016; Kentmen-
Cin and Erisen, 2017; de Vries, 2018). Particularly relevant for our study, recent works show 
how perceived potential cultural and identity threats posed by the influx of immigrants affect 
opposition to European integration, especially in light of the fact that enlargement implies 
freedom of movement within the single market and may be eventually linked to common 
immigration policies (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen, 2017; 
Koopmans and Michalowski, 2017)1. While this research has produced important knowledge 
about the determinants of views on European integration, it has also displaced attention from 
the positive externalities that citizens’ support of EU unification may actually generate. The 
following article addresses this gap as we examine theoretically and empirically how 
attitudes toward EU integration form public opinion on migration. 
Scholars have developed and investigated several theories to explain the drivers behind 
people’s attitudes toward immigrants (for comprehensive overviews, see, Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Individual-level characteristics, such as 
socio-economic status, left-right self-placements, or deep-seated psychological differences as 
well as country-level economic and political characteristics seem to matter (Haubert and 
Fussell, 2006; Mayda, 2006; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Dinesen et al., 2016; 
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Bello, 2017). Particularly after 2015, when an 
unprecedented number of people arrived in the EU, traveling across the Mediterranean Sea or 
overland through Southeast Europe, understanding public attitudes toward non-European 
migrants within their host communities has become an urgent task for academics and 
practitioners. Against this background, we argue that in-group and out-group dynamics play a 
central role in explaining opinion formation on immigration, especially in the context of the 
EU. One perspective here posits that regional integration projects are a first step toward the 
construction of broader communities with open and universalistic values (Archibugi, 1998; 
Eriksen, 2009). Eller et al. (2017), among others, challenge the notion that legislations cannot 
alter strong customs (‘mores’). Using a large field study, they show how intergroup contact 
affects prejudice before and after a structural change from segregation to integration. This 
means that the effect of intergroup contact is also driven by the social structure that frames 
intergroup relations (Eller et al., 2017). 
In this sense, the process of EU integration provides this very social structure that can 
interact with the way people categorize in-group and out-group members and thus generate 
positive contact effects. It has also fostered a dual identity, i.e., a European identity coexists 
with national ones in a mutually reinforcing relation (Klandermans et al., 2004; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005), while the experience of regional integration can form cosmopolitan beliefs by 
promoting openness and tolerance (Eriksen, 2009; Kuhn, 2015; Dinesen et al., 2016; Bello, 
2017). In other words, citizens who are more supportive of EU unification tend to be more 
                                               
1 The special issue of European Union Politics, edited by Kentmen-Cin and Erisen (2017), discusses various 
aspects of the state of the existing research on immigration and support for European integration. De Vreese  
(2017) summarizes the main findings and lessons learned. 
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open, globalized, and are more likely to develop a cosmopolitan identity. Furthermore, the 
process toward a supranational identity is argued to have just moved the external boundaries 
of the in-group from national to EU borders (Schlenker, 2013). When subscribing to these 
claims, we should expect EU integration support to result in more supportive immigration 
sentiments and more positive attitudes toward immigrants, including non-European born 
individuals. 
For a systematic analysis of public attitudes toward migration, we draw on data from all 
relevant European Social Survey (ESS)2 rounds as well as individual-level panel data from 
the German Longitudinal Election Data (GLED)3. We combine macro and micro-level 
variables in hierarchical models to address limitations when using either macro or micro-
level data alone. Most importantly, the correlation between group means of two variables at 
the macro level may lead to the wrong inferences about individual-level correlation 
(Robinson, 1950; Freedman, 1999). Hence, using only aggregate data to infer about 
individual-level parameters can be problematic. Moreover, there may be direct effects on 
individual behavior beyond what we might expect given the specific individual values when, 
e.g., the average economic prosperity of a region has ‘effects on an individual over and above 
the effects of the individual’s economic status’ (Greenland, 2001, p.1343). As such, recent 
research recommends integrating observations at all levels, particularly individual (which 
examines exposures and responses of individuals) and contextual levels (examines exposures 
and responses of aggregates of individuals) (see Fortin-Rittberger et al., 2016; Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010). Accordingly, we employ hierarchical models on the ESS data before using 
individual-level panel data from the GLED. 
Our results suggest that supportive regional integration views, in our case within the 
European context toward EU unification, are positively associated with public acceptance of 
non-European migration. The larger the support for EU unification, the more favorable is an 
individual’s view toward migration from outside Europe. This finding makes a three-fold 
contribution. First, we put forward and test a theoretical argument on how public opinion 
toward migration can be affected by regional integration support. Whereas previous studies 
(e.g., Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Curtis, 2014; García-Faroldi, 2017) look at the correlation 
between immigration attitudes and views of European integration, systematic theoretical 
arguments are generally missing and there is hardly a specific focus on how the latter can 
actually lead to the former. Second, we look at how the support for EU unification leads to 
less hostility toward migrants from what can be defined as a classical out-group. We thus 
depart from earlier work that may have a stronger focus on migration from other EU 
countries (Curtis, 2014). Third, previous research disproportionally relies on cross-sectional 
data, which are unable to control for important influences that are likely to be correlated with 
public support toward integration projects and out-group prejudice such as the degree of 
nationalism (Haubert and Fussell, 2006; Curtis, 2014; Bello, 2017). We use hierarchical 
models and individual panel data to address some of these concerns. In the panel-data 
analysis, we analyze the individual evolution of attitudes in a longitudinal approach while 
controlling for individual fixed-effects. In the hierarchical-model setup, we supplement 
macro-level variables with individual-specific information to leverage complementarities. 
This significantly contributes to our understanding of how people’s views of migration are 
formed and shows that public opinion in favor of EU unification has a thus far unidentified 
positive externality. 
 
I. Public Opinion toward Migration and Attitudes on EU Integration 
                                               
2 Available at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. 
3 Available at: https://www.gesis.org/en/elections-home/gles/. 
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The literature on the determinants of attitudes toward immigration is centered on the idea that 
identity shapes intergroup relations. Less supportive views usually emerge when members of 
an out-group are perceived as a threat to one’s own in-group. The nature of these threats can 
vary and are related to either competition over material resources or symbolic and intangible 
constructs. The first approach in this context, labeled by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) the 
political-economy explanation, is rooted in self-interest accounts: individuals concerned with 
labor opportunities and fiscal pressure have negative views on immigration. Under the 
assumption of perfect substitutability between natives and immigrants, low-skilled workers 
feel more threatened by the arrival of immigrants, thus supporting more restrictive 
immigration policies (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001); conversely, countries with more high-
skilled workers exhibit higher levels of support for immigration (Mayda, 2006).  
The second strand of literature focusing on intangible threats has accumulated strong and 
consistent empirical support. This socio-cultural perspective on immigration attitudes does 
not, however, deny the importance of economic considerations. In fact, symbolic threats can 
be directed toward culture, social life, and also the economy. The key point is that self-
interest explanations based on individuals’ economic conditions are less relevant than 
sociotropic factors (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). For example, perceptions of 
immigrants as a threat to the national economy are associated with more hostility toward 
migration regardless of personal economic conditions (Citrin et al., 1997).  
Social psychologists have focused more specifically on individual-level factors that help 
explain attitudes toward immigration within the framework of social identity theory. 
Different from personal identity, social identity is rooted in group membership and concerns 
intergroup relation and conflict (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Importantly, individuals will aim 
for positive social identity to boost self-esteem by favorably comparing their in-group to an 
out-group (Brown, 2000). It follows that social identity theory addresses in-group bias 
against the out-group even when there are no explicit or objective causes of conflict. Realist 
conflict theorists have argued that social identity processes interact with instrumental 
motivations and real threats (e.g., security and jobs) and exacerbate negative attitudes (Sherif, 
1966). Social psychologists stress, however, that fears do not have to be material as symbolic 
and perceived threats to group integrity foster prejudice as well. This is consistent with recent 
research showing that individuals are overwhelmingly worried about social effects of 
immigration and less about their personal security (Erisen and Kentmen-Cin, 2017). That 
said, the fact remains that individuals will try to boost their self-esteem by finding a superior 
feature of one’s own group compared to an out-group (Brown, 2000; Erisen, 2017).  
Hence, social identity theory explains in-group favoritism, with some studies finding that 
national identification by itself is a strong predictor of xenophobic attitudes (Brown et al., 
2001). Relatedly, opinion formation on immigrants largely depends on individuals’ 
identification with their in-group. The perceived threat posed by immigration shapes attitudes 
toward migrants only if individuals identify themselves with the nation and prioritize that 
identity. But it is likely that EU membership per se can alter how in-groups and out-groups 
are defined in the first place. When multiple identities are available, individuals can ‘re-
categorize themselves’ in ways that reduce distinctions between groups that used to be 
separate (Curtis, 2014, p.523). Specifically, identifying as an EU citizen promotes contact 
and positive attitudes toward the newly defined in-group, which now encompasses former 
out-group members. Furthermore, EU identity may not have to replace the national identity in 
order to exert this positive influence (Curtis, 2014). In fact, in one of its formulations, contact 
theory predicts optimal effects in reducing prejudice when re-categorization to the 
superordinate group follows previous salient categorization at the subgroup level (Pettigrew, 
1998). By doing so sequentially, individuals can first acknowledge salient intergroup 
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differences and then, over the course of subsequent interactions, re-categorize themselves and 
out-group members under an overarching, superordinate group membership (Eller and 
Abrams, 2004). 
Even in its earliest formulation, though, contact theory does not predict positive changes 
due to and as a consequence of contact per se. Allport (1954) points to shared common goals, 
equal status, and institutional support for contact as essential factors for successful 
interactions. In absence of these pre-conditions, contact may even induce adversarial 
associations. Another important condition for the generalization of positive attitudes to a 
whole out-group is the typicality of the out-group members with whom contact takes place. 
In their Common In-Group Identity Model (CIIM), Gaertner and Dovidio (2014) highlight 
the trade-off of dual identities in which first contact may generate a less positive attitude 
toward the out-group because of the salience of the subgroup identity. Yet, exactly because of 
this salience, positive contact is more likely to be generalized to the out-group as a whole, 
particularly so when out-group members are ‘typical’ representatives of their group (Dovidio 
et al., 2003). Indeed, pleasant contact reduces stereotyping and negative prejudice toward the 
specific out-group members, but can also extend to other members of the out-group if the 
individual is representative of the group. This makes positive contact not just an 
interpersonal, but an intergroup event (Pettigrew, 1998). While the existence of a single, 
inclusive group identity may not satisfy people’s simultaneous necessities for both 
distinctiveness and inclusion with a large group membership like nationality, a dual identity 
is more likely to develop positive out-group feelings (Brewer, 1996; Eller et al., 2017). 
Extensive literature supports the idea that this strategy makes differences less salient and 
reduces distinctiveness – thus discrimination – among groups. When the relevant groups are 
represented by natives and immigrants, the need for superordinate identities is inevitable, 
because the identity boundaries for natives are linked to ethnicity and language, especially in 
Europe (Erisen, 2017). With national identity boundaries being impermeable to immigrants, 
non-natives can resort to European identification as a superordinate group. According to 
Erisen (2017), immigrants have more incentives to identify as European than natives exactly 
for this reason. Hence, the contact model and the social identity theory ultimately converge to 
a dual-identity model in which the superordinate identity reduces prejudice by mediating 
contact and allowing generalization of positive attitudes both among natives and migrants. 
More recently, Eller et al. (2017) remind us that legislative changes can affect behavior, 
opportunities, and how inter-group contacts can decrease prejudice. In light of experimental 
research and cross-sectional surveys, they show that the way intergroup and superordinate 
categorization drive prejudice also depends on the ‘externally imposed structure of the 
intergroup context. When groups are clearly categorized as different and this is legitimized 
by institutional support (in Allport’s, 1954, terms), it may be that people’s acceptance and 
understanding of the intergroup structure attenuates tendencies towards prejudice. [...] Such a 
situation might be reflected by state-approved multiculturalism, or by federalism, for 
example, which support a ‘live and let live’ perspective on group differences’ (Eller et al., 
2017, p.23; see also Bello, 2017). We argue that the process of EU integration has created the 
potential for social psychological processes and levels of categorization to reduce prejudice, 
also fostered such dual identity, and induced more cosmopolitan attitudes in European 
citizens. Consequently, EU integration support may result in more positive attitudes toward 
immigrants. 
At first sight, though, the link between EU integration and cosmopolitanism may not be 
obvious as arguments against this relationship can be made in light of a variety of studies. As 
commonly claimed, free movement of people established by the EU integration process has 
led to heightened preoccupations about immigrations’ economic impact (McLaren, 2002; De 
Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2005; Van Klingeren et al., 2013). Perceived threats from out-
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groups are found to promote higher levels of Euroskepticism, possibly because individuals 
identify the abolition of borders as a source of these threats (McLaren, 2002). Regional 
integration may ultimately reinforce in-group preferences and diminish support for 
immigration. After all, the EU comprises a community of members (see also Bello, 2016) and 
conditions for membership do exist. These communitarian traits within the EU could suggest 
that European identity is not compatible with cosmopolitanism (Schlenker, 2013). 
Interestingly, however, Schlenker (2013) reveals that both civic and cultural constructions of 
EU identity are positively associated with cosmopolitan attitudes; only ethnic construction, 
i.e., a European parent as a requirement for being European, is negatively associated with 
these, if only weakly. According to García‐Faroldi (2017), European identity is mostly built 
on civic grounds, thus indicating that the positive roles of civic and cultural traits in an EU 
identity lessen the potential negative effect of ethnic constructs. Finally, the idea that EU 
integration recreates nationalist in-group dynamics at a larger scale is questioned by the 
fuzziness of the EU as supranational entity. On one hand, this is because only a small 
percentage of Europeans identify themselves as exclusively EU, while the vast majority 
claims a dual identity (Zürn, 2018). If anything, this suggests that EU boundaries may not 
provide much of an ‘anchorage point for delimitation’ of new in-groups and out-groups 
(Schlenker, 2013, p.36). On the other hand, and more importantly for public attitudes, 
European citizens do not necessarily use the EU as reference for ‘us’ (EU) and ‘them’ (non-
EU). McLaren (2001) finds that when asked about allowing entry of immigrants from EU and 
Southern Mediterranean countries, the majority of respondents give identical answers for 
both groups. In a survey experiment in Denmark, Dinesen et al. (2016) report that skills 
rather than country of origin better explain immigration attitudes. 
In its institutional dimension, cosmopolitanism does not necessarily have a global scope 
(Haubert and Fussell, 2006; Kuhn et al., 2018). Support for the EU and self-identification as 
‘European’ entails a cosmopolitan stance to the extent that it legitimizes a supranational 
authority (Held, 2002; Kuhn et al., 2018). In this context, Archibugi (1998, p.219) adequately 
portrays the EU as ‘the first international model, which begins to resemble the cosmopolitan 
model’. Importantly, again, cosmopolitan preferences do not obliterate other embedding; 
rather, individuals can identify with a variety of communities, including the national. Data 
show that both cosmopolitan beliefs and attachment to the EU have increased over time. 
From 1999 to 2009, the percentage of Europeans that felt at least somewhat attached to 
Europe has grown from 58 percent to 75 percent. Coupled with a decrease from 31 percent to 
20 percent of respondents exclusively identifying with their nation, this suggests the 
emergence of a dual identity. Furthermore, since 2005 the level of cosmopolitan feelings 
moved up from 41 percent to 64 percent (Schlenker, 2013). 
The experience of regional integration and the development of a dual identity moderate in-
group vs. out-group positioning, and foster cosmopolitan beliefs by promoting openness and 
tolerance, all traits linked to positive immigration attitudes. Instead of re-entrenchment 
toward in-groups, the increased possibility and frequency of transitional movement enables 
shared experiences that fuel collective identities and a ‘we-feeling’ (Kuhn, 2015). We move 
from the idea that European integration represents the cosmopolitan prototype and vanguard 
(Eriksen, 2009), which might truly promote supportive immigration sentiments. Ultimately, 
we thus expect that and empirically test in the following whether EU integration results in 
more positive attitudes toward immigrants.  
 
II. Research Design and Empirical Analysis 
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Our empirical approach is two-fold: first, we merge individual-level data using all relevant 
rounds4 of the European Social Survey (ESS) and employ hierarchical models; second, we 
use individual-level panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Data. We start with 
the ESS research design and discussion of findings, before moving to the panel-data analysis 
based on the GLED. The ESS is one of the most methodologically rigorous regional cross-
national survey projects. Initiated in 2002, there are eight rounds so far covering more than 
30 European states until 2016. The ESS’s chief advantage is that survey practices are 
harmonized to reduce the likelihood that different results between countries are driven by 
alterations in how the survey is conducted in each state. To this end, the ESS has developed 
strict guidelines for consistent methods of fieldwork. These practices require, among others, a 
random sampling design of residents 15 years and older (no quota sampling), one-hour face-
to-face interviews, a target response rate of 70 percent, and a minimum of 2,000 respondents 
per country. These characteristics make the ESS particularly useful for our purpose. In the 
ESS analysis, we also use aggregated contextual data, which are exogenous to individual-
level units, such as economic indicators or the level of democracy. When theories are based 
on the assumption that individuals are affected by the context in which they operate, the 
combination of individual and contextual-level data is encouraged (see Fortin-Rittberger et 
al., 2016; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010).  
 
ESS Data Analysis 
Dependent Variable and Methodology 
For the ESS data analysis, we merge all integrated data files of all relevant rounds of the ESS 
covering 2002-2016 (including ESS round 8, edition 2.0). The individual constitutes our unit 
of analysis. With these specifications, our initial sample ultimately comprises more than 
200,000 individuals from more than 30 states since 2004.5 The outcome variable for the ESS 
analysis is based on the ESS survey question ‘[t]o what extent do you think that your country 
should allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe’6. Possible answers include 
‘allow many to come and live here’, ‘allow some’, ‘allow a few’, and ‘allow none’. We first 
deleted all individuals who have not responded to this question or expressed no opinion (‘do 
not know’) before transforming this item into a binary variable capturing attitudes in favor of 
outside migration (1) or not (0); the ‘allow many’ and ‘allow some’ categories are merged 
into a single value of 1, while the ‘allow a few’ and ‘allow none’ categories pertain to the 
value of 0 of the new dichotomous item. We thus end up with a variable measuring individual 
attitudes towards outside-Europe migration, which theoretically ranges in [0; 1] with 1 
indicating that an individual perceives migration from outside Europe as favorable. 
Due to this hierarchical nature of our data, we use a random-intercept approach 
(Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). Hence, we incorporate a country-level as well as a year-level 
intercept to account for the specific hierarchical, three-level nature of the pooled data set in 
each of the models. This accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the year and country levels 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2009). Both random intercepts are modeled according to a 
normal distribution (Gelman and Hill, 2009). We include in all estimations a sample weight 
combination of population size and a post-stratification weight as suggested by the ESS 
documentation. 
 
                                               
4 ESS rounds are relevant when comprising the EU unification question, i.e., rounds 2, 3, 4, and 6-8. ESS rounds 
1 and 5 do not include the EU integration item. 
5 The sample also includes, with varying years covered, Turkey and Israel. Our results are robust when omitting 
these two states, however. 
6 A question not linked to the degree of wealth/poverty of immigrants’ home countries does not exist in the 
surveys. 
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Explanatory Variables: EU Unification and Control Items 
Our main explanatory variable is people’s attitudes toward regional integration projects, 
primarily in a European context. To this end, we focus on the following ESS survey item: 
‘[t]hinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. 
Others say it has already gone too far. What number on the scale [0 to 10] best describes your 
position’? High scale values indicate less Euroscepticism i.e., people believe that unification 
should go further and we expect to find a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with the outside-Europe migration public opinion item, our dependent variable. 
We also control for a series of other variables that may either be seen as alternative 
determinants of individuals’ attitudes toward outside-Europe migration or correlate with 
people’s support for EU unification (see also Curtis, 2014; Bello, 2017). First, we consider a 
respondent’s age and gender. Women might systematically differ from men in attitudes 
toward migration, while older individuals tend to be more conservative and, hence, could be 
less likely to see outside-Europe migration as something they might want to support. We 
exclude respondents below the age of 18 as they usually cannot vote in national elections and 
drop respondents who indicated to be older than 105. 
We also control for the economic status of a respondent via an individual’s level of 
education, their unemployment status, and household income. First, Education is an ordinal 
variable capturing the highest level of education and receives values between 0 (not possible 
to harmonize into the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)) and 7 
(higher tertiary education). Second, unemployment receives a value of 1 unless a respondent 
indicates that s/he is (self-) employed or working for a family business. Third, a decile 
approach is applied when measuring household income in the ESS. The categories of that 
variable are national and based on deciles of the actual household income range in the given 
country. Household Income thus receives a value between 1 and 12, with higher values 
standing for a respondent’s household belonging to a wealthier one. 
In addition, there are individuals’ general beliefs and issue position we consider. First, the 
mean voter position, or the left-right self-placement, is arguably one of the most robust 
predictors of attitudes toward migration. The more ‘conservative’ or ‘right’ individuals tend 
to place themselves, the less likely it is that they are in favor of more immigration into their 
countries, regardless of whether this comes from within Europe or outside. The ESS provides 
the following survey item to measure individuals’ left-right self-placement: ‘[p]eople 
sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right.’ Using this card, where would you place yourself on this 
scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right’? Second, the ESS asks people about 
their religiosity; the variable follows an ordinal scale and ranges between 0 (not religious at 
all) and 10 (very religious). Finally, Curtis (2014, p.524f) highlights the importance of 
individuals’ security concerns and whether they were born in the country they live in. For the 
former, security concerns are captured via an ordinal variable that measures on a 6-point 
scale whether people see it as very much important to live in a secure and safe environment 
(6) or not at all (1). We expect this item to be negatively signed. For the latter influence, the 
ESS provides a binary indicator, which we expect to be negatively signed: if a respondent 
was born outside the country in which they currently live in, they should be more open 
towards migration from outside Europe.  
We also take into account several variables at the country level. First, there is the 
population size (stock) of immigrants and refugees living in a country. We take data from the 
World Bank (Özden et al., 2011) that defines migrants as people born in a country other than 
that in which they permanently live. Refugees are included in this variable, as are persons in 
refugee-like situations and asylum seekers. Hence, this variable captures the entire population 
of foreign-born individuals living in a state. We replaced any missing observations in these 
variables by 0s and added the value of 1 before taking the natural logarithm. The final 
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variable, Migration Population (ln), then provides information on the (logged) size of 
foreign-born populations per country-year. Second, more democratic forms of government 
allow for more deliberative decision-making and facilitate free speech while more democratic 
countries could also be more open to regional integration or immigration. While all our 
sample states are formally democratic, there are still differences across them in the actual 
level of democracy, and we control for its variation by including the polity2 item from the 
Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2016). This is a 21-point scale ranging from −10 to 
10, with higher values for states with more democratic institutions. In our sample, the item 
ranges in [4; 10] and has a mean value of about 9.299. Third, we control for population and 
income at the country level. Both variables are log-transformed to account for their skewed 
distributions and taken from the World Bank Development Indicators. We control for 
population size of a state as more diverse views and heterogeneous attitudes are expected to 
emerge with larger populations. The World Bank’s population item comprises all residents 
regardless of legal status or citizenship, but refugees not permanently settled are excluded. 
GDP per capita is measured in constant 2000 USD and is defined as the gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population. Income captures the economic situation in a country 
at the macro level: especially when economic conditions are more difficult, people tend to 
perceive migration as less favorable (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Curtis, 2014). Table 1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables we just discussed. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Public Opinion Outside Migration 264,209  0.467 0.499 0 1 
EU Unification 247,236 5.123 2.679 0 10 
Mean Voter Position 237,336 5.150 2.250 0 10 
Religiosity 273,246 4.717 3.037 0 10 
Native 275,489 0.906 0.293 0 1 
Age 275,776 49.054 17.955 18 105 
Education 275,102 3.113 2.237 0 7 
Household Income 211,153 5.462 2.784 1 12 
Security 267,589 4.686 1.208 1 6 
Gender 275,644 0.541 0.498 0 1 
Unemployed 275,776 0.094 0.292 0 1 
Democracy 275,776 9.299 1.391 4 10 
Population (ln) 275,776 16.336 1.303 12.585 18.788 
GDP per capita (ln) 275,776 10.196 0.783 7.221 11.528 




The main models of our first set of analyses are provided in Table 2. Models 1 and 2 omit all 
control variables, but include random intercepts for countries and years. The two estimations 
only differ in the inclusion (Model 2) or exclusion (Model 1) of year-fixed effects. Model 3 
adds the individual-level controls to Model 1, but we omit the country-level covariates, which 
are then introduced in Model 4. The table entries allow for a direct interpretation of 
coefficient direction and statistical significance only, but we summarize the more substantive 
quantities of interest of Models 1 and 4 in Figure 2. 
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Coming to our main hypothesis, Table 2 and Figure 2 provide strong support for our 
expectation. Regardless of model specification, EU Unification is positively signed and 
statistically significant in all model estimations. Adding or dropping variables does not alter 
the substance of this finding. Figure 2 sheds more substantive light on this result. When 
moving from the minimum to the maximum of EU Unification, the probability of having 
favorable views on outside-EU migration increases from about 30% to 70 percent.  
The control variables are mostly significant and in the expected direction. Older 
individuals, those who have more conservative views on the left-right self-placement, 
natives, and people with security concerns tend to see migration more skeptical. On the other 
hand, females, wealthier, and more educated individuals are more in favor of outside-EU 
migration. Interestingly, unemployed respondents are associated with fewer prejudices 
against immigrants, perhaps because perceived economic threats, in terms of job competition 
or the fiscal burden placed by immigrants on public finance, are already picked up by income 
and education. The result for GDP per capita at the country level mirrors the income finding 
at the individual level, and we also see that more democratic states tend to have more positive 







Table 2: Public opinion on migration and European integration 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
EU Unification 0.037 0.037 0.032 0.035 
  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.002)**  (0.001)** 
Mean Voter Position   -0.026 -0.030 
    (0.002)**  (0.001)** 
Religiosity   0.005 0.006 
    (0.001)**  (0.001)** 
Native   -0.072 -0.067 
    (0.014)**  (0.012)** 
Age   -0.002 -0.002 
    (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Education   0.031 0.033 
    (0.002)**  (0.001)** 
Household Income   0.008 0.009 
    (0.001)**  (0.000)** 
Security   -0.025 -0.026 
    (0.002)**  (0.002)** 
Gender   0.004 0.007 
    (0.002)*  (0.002)** 
Unemployed   0.008 0.001 
    (0.008)  (0.005) 
Democracy    0.045 
     (0.012)** 
Population (ln)    0.009 
     (0.011) 
GDP per capita (ln)    0.079 
     (0.015)** 
























































































     (0.014) 
Constant  0.288 0.279 0.577       -1.086 
  (0.010)**  (0.012)**  (0.025)**  (0.209)** 
Obs. 240,421 240,421 168,248 152,194 
Random Intercepts for 
Years and Countries Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Temporal Fixed Effects No Yes No No 
 
Source: ESS, all waves. 





































Note: Graph shows linear predictions of Public Opinion Outside Migration while holding all other covariates 




German Longitudinal Election Study Analysis 
Dependent Variable and Methodology 
We also perform an analysis based on different data – the German Longitudinal Election 
Study (GLES), which is a genuine longitudinal data set at the individual level. What follows 
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then not only allows us to assess the validity of our findings from the ESS analysis with 
different data, but also to exploit the longitudinal nature of the GLES. That is, for some 
questions and some rounds of the GLES, the same individuals have been interviewed over 
time – a feature that is not given for the ESS. Still, the availability of questions limits our 
analysis to mainly two waves: 1 and 12, while the EU integration item is based on waves 3 
and 10.7 All these waves are sufficiently distant to exploit relevant changes in our core 
variables. For the outcome variable in the following, we focus on people’s opinion on 
whether the means of entry for immigration should be more limited or eased. Respondents 
could reply on a scale from 1 (ease means of entry) to 7 (limit means of entry). This question 
was included in both GLES waves 1 and 12. We reverse the direction of the variable to 
simplify its interpretation, with higher values now corresponding to more positive attitudes 
towards immigrants. Using the information over time, our dependent variable is then based 
on the changes in opinion across the waves. Eventually, we obtain a variable that ranges in [-
6; 6] with values above 0 standing for individuals who became more open to immigration 
from wave 1 to 12, values below 0 pertaining to immigration attitudes that became more 
restrictive, and 0 standing for no change in people’s attitudes. We rely on OLS for the model 
estimations. 
 
Explanatory Variables: EU Unification and Control Items 
The GLES variable on EU Unification mirrors the one from the ESS. On a scale from 1-7, 
people were asked what they think of the European integration process, with 1 standing for 
European integration should move forward and 7 signifying integration has already gone too 
far. Similar to the outcome variable in this analysis, we use the inverse of the original 
variable and rely on the first difference, i.e., how individuals’ views have changed over the 
waves (3 and 10). Our final variable ranges in [-6; 6] with values above 0 standing for 
individuals who became more supportive of the European integration project from wave 3 to 
10, values below 0 pertaining to more skeptical views, and 0 standing for no change in 
people’s attitudes. Next to this item, we control for a set of socio-demographic variables, 
which are all taken from the GLES. First, we consider a respondent’s age at the end of wave 
12 and gender. The GLES sample is almost evenly divided into males and females, while the 
average age is 53 years at the end of wave 12. 
We also control for the economic status of a respondent via an individual’s level of 
education, their unemployment status, and household income. First, education is an ordinal 
variable capturing improvements in the level of education over the two waves and receives 
values between 0 (no change in education) and 4 (maximum change in education, which is 
from no high-school degree to A levels). Second, the individual-level unemployment variable 
receives a value of -1 if a respondent became unemployed between wave 1 and wave 12, 0 if 
there was no change in the employment status, or 1 if a previously unemployed individual 
secured employment by wave 12. Third, a decile approach is applied when measuring income 
in the GLES, ranging from below 500 Euros per month and per household (1) to 10,000 
Euros and more (13). Our final variable, Household Income, is also based on changes 
between the two waves to capture differences in household wealth across time and ranges in 
[-10; 11]. Additionally, we control for individuals’ general beliefs and issue position. First, 
there is the mean voter position in terms of a respondent’s change in the left-right self-
placement. This item’s operationalization mirrors the measure described in the ESS analysis, 
except we focus on inter-wave changes. In addition, the GLES asks people about how 
religious they are; the variable follows an ordinal scale and ranges between 1 (very religious) 
                                               
7 In more detail, a question about the EU unification process is included in waves 3, 6, 10, and 15-17. Several of 
the other variables, in particular the controls, are merely considered for waves 1 and 12 (or adjacent ones). With 
a few to maximize sample size and compatibility, we then opted for waves 3 and 10 for EU Unification. 
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and 5 (not religious at all). Similar to the other controls, our final variable captures individual 
changes in religiosity. Table 3 summarizes the variables we use for the GLES analysis. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Public Opinion Migration 2,119  -0.188 1.584 -6 6 
EU Unification 2,194 0.433 1.679 -6 6 
Mean Voter Position 1,769 0.076 1.823 -10 10 
Religiosity 2,275 -0.061 0.694 -4 3 
Age 2,725 52.939 13.775 22 87 
Education 2,307 0.077 0.333 0 4 
Household Income 2,222 0.411 1.686 -10 11 
Gender 2,725 0.505 0.500 0 1 
Unemployed 2,725 -0.061 0.694 -1 1 
 
Findings 
The GLES models are summarized in Table 4. Model 5 only comprises our main variable of 
interest, while Model 6 simply includes the controls. Model 7 is the full estimation as we 
include both EU Unification and the controls, while Model 8 mirrors Model 7 except we omit 
those individuals who have not changed their view on European integration over the two 
waves. First, the result for EU Unification mirrors what we report in the previous analysis. 
The variable is positively signed throughout the models in Table 4. Hence, if a respondent 
became more supportive of European integration by one unit, migration support was higher 
by about 0.113-0.173 units over time. This is a quite large effect, given that the standard 
deviation of the dependent variable is about 1.6. Figure 2 underlines this as we depict the 
change in the expected value of Public Opinion Outside Migration when increasing EU 
Unification by one unit. As we can see in Figure 2, the coefficient of EU Unification is 
statistically different from 0 at conventional levels, and of the same order of magnitude of 
other important drivers of migration attitudes, such as age or education, albeit in the opposite 
direction. 
 
Table 4: Public opinion on migration and European integration 
 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
EU Unification 0.125  0.113 0.173 
  (0.021)**   (0.023)**  (0.036)** 
Mean Voter Position  -0.103 -0.091 -0.162 
   (0.021)**  (0.021)**  (0.036)** 
Religiosity  -0.073 -0.102 -0.170 
   (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.089) 
Age  -0.010 -0.009 -0.014 
   (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.005)** 
Education  -0.218 -0.141 -0.259 
   (0.126)  (0.127)  (0.206) 
Household Income  -0.011 -0.009 -0.013 
   (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.040) 
Gender  -0.225 -0.208 -0.349 
   (0.079)**  (0.079)**  (0.129)** 
Unemployed  0.224 0.143 0.293 
   (0.186)  (0.192)  (0.331) 
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Constant  -0.248 0.472 0.379        0.577 
  (0.037)**  (0.174)**  (0.174)*  (0.284)* 
Obs. 1,820 1,522 1,478 886 
Only Change in Public Opinion 
Migration No No No Yes 
 
Source: GLES. 
Table entries are coefficients; robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. 
 
Finally, there seems to be a systematic difference between males and females in our 
sample in that the former have less positive views toward migration. Older respondents are 
also less supportive of migration, as one would expect. Unemployment is statistically 
insignificant according to Figure 2, so are Education and Household Income. The results for 
Mean Voter Position are similar to what we have found and discussed above: people on the 
right of the left-right spectrum are less supportive of migration and more in favor of 
restricting immigration. Unlike what we found in the ESS analysis, though, more religious 
people in Germany tend to have less positive migration views. Note, however, that previous 
findings on the impact of religion-based variables on migration attitudes are largely 
inconclusive and more research is needed to investigate how the variety of dimensions of 
religiosity may have differential effects on prejudice against migrants (Ceobanu and 




































Note: Graph shows first differences for the expected values of Public Opinion Migration, while holding all 
other covariates constant at their medians; horizontal bars signify 90 percent confidence interval; first difference 




To successfully manage the recent global migration and refugee ‘crises’ requires not only 
political will, but also supportive publics that see immigration favorably. In democracies, 
national governments are particularly unwilling to adopt unpopular policies not to lose office 
and power (Anderson et al., 2017). Migration and its corresponding policies are not an 
exception here (e.g., Helbling and Kalkum, 2018). Hence, public attitudes on immigration are 
extremely relevant for political leaders and understanding the drivers behind these is as 
important to the public as to the academic discourse. But how are citizens’ attitudes toward 
immigration formed? A number of recent studies accounts for variations in perceptions and 
public opinion across individuals and countries. As a key driver of attitude towards 
immigration is the in-group vs. out-group positioning, we have advanced the claim that EU 
unification attitudes and dual identity can moderate this difference and alter how groups are 
defined in the first place. The largely continuous process of political and economic 
integration within Europe, with an increasing number of people crossing national borders, has 
reduced the relevance of cultural barriers among member states. The strengthening and 
widening of European integration has transformed national identities so that more people 
identify themselves as part of a supra-national community. This process of regional 
integration fostered cosmopolitan attitudes and, in turn, contributed to positive views toward 
immigration. To test our expectation, we employed hierarchical models on all relevant data 
rounds of the ESS before using individual-level panel data from the GLED. The evidence 
consistently suggests that respondents with positive attitudes toward European integration 
also tend to have more pro-immigration sentiments. 
Future research should analyze the relation between public opinion toward migration and 
European integration conditional on three key factors: the size and type of the foreign-born 
population in a country, the opportunity for direct contact, and the type of state responses. 
First, recent research shows that the type of immigration matters and that higher exposure to 
permanent immigrants leads to more tolerant attitudes toward outsiders, whereas large 
number of short-term immigrants can induce more skeptical views (Bello, 2017). The ESS 
comprises different attitudinal variables representing tolerance toward immigration of the 
same or different race or ethnic group and immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe 
(see, e.g., Czaika and Di Lillo, 2018). Disaggregating the type of immigration into settlement 
status, duration, and country of origin, and looking at how EU integration has different 
impacts on different out-groups seems in light of this a fruitful avenue for future research.  
Second, contact itself can elicit negative stereotyping or decrease prejudice against 
immigrants, depending on the frequency, depth, and circumstances. While previous studies 
often used immigration flows to proxy for exposure, we need better data on opportunities for 
and frequency of contact to effectively take into account whether, e.g., ethnic or religious 
groups are segregated, or other hurdles to the opportunity for direct contact exist.  
Third, immigrants are more likely to create tensions with local populations and intergroup 
anxiety when countries are unprepared to manage large population movements or are 
unfamiliar with these emergencies (see Böhmelt et al., 2019). Distrust of migrants is often 
heightened by economic hardship and increased contact with out-group members in times of 
crisis can elicit negative stereotyping and reinforce – rather than reduce – anti-immigration 
stances (García‐Faroldi, 2017). The provision of integration programs for migrants such as 
language-training or labor-market support is not only important for their economic 
integration and fiscal contribution, but also facilitates the political and social integration into 
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host societies and improves the odds of positive interaction with native communities. 
Ultimately, this can further increase the positive effect of the regional integration project. 
Because of the lack of empirical studies on key mechanisms, there is a crowded agenda for 
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